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THE SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT
The constitutional basis for national copyright legislation
is in Article i, Section 8, "The Congress shall have power:
. . .to promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
Section 4 of the Copyright Act of March 4, i909, provides,
"That the works for which copyright may be secured under
this act shall include all the writings of an author."
This is a wide and a sensible departure from all earlier
statutes, which, by enumerating the various things which
might be copyrighted, endangered liberal construction.
Under the present act there is no limitation in the statute
of the subject matter of copyright, except that imposed
upon Congress by the constitutional grant of power.
Copyright protection, therefore, extends to all the writings
of an author which promote the progress of science and
useful arts.
This involves the consideration of three questions: (a)
What is a writing? (b) What is an author? (c) What
will promote the progress of science and useful arts?
What is a Writing?
"A writing," said Mr. Justice Miller, includes "all forms
of writing, printing, engraving, etching, etc., by which the
ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression."
The case in which this language was used arose under
the Copyright Act of July i8, 1874, and involved the validity
of the copyright of one of Sarony's photographs of Oscar-
Wilde., It was argued that since photographs were not
The citation of authorities is intended to be suggestive rather than ex-
haustive.
'The proceeding was brought in 1882 during Wilde's lecture tour in this
country, when his vogue was enormous though based almost entirely on im-
pudence, long hair and knee breeches, a volume of poems and some pronounced
opinions on art. The reporter of the Supreme Court begins his statement of
the case thus: "This was a suit for an infringement of a copyright in a photo-
graph of one Oscar Wilde," perhaps as a dissent from Wilde's well known and
often expressed opinion of himself. See Newton, Amenities of Book Collecting,
Boston, The Atlantic Monthly Press, z918, Chapter XII.
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mentioned in the act as copyrightable subject matter, they
were excluded from its scope, and further that a photograph
was not a writing.2
The court, after commenting on the inclusion of maps
and charts in the copyright acts of 179o and 1802, as giving
a construction to the language of the constitution by men
who were contemporary with it, many of whom were mem-
bers of the convention which formed it, (Mr. Justice Miller)
said:
"These statutes certainly answer the objection that books
only, or writing in the limited sense of a book and its author,
are within the constitutional provision."
"We entertain no doubt that the Constitution is broad
enough to cover an act authorizing copyright of photo-
graphs so far as they are representatives of original intel-
lectual conceptions of the author."
"The third finding of facts says, in regard to the photo-
graph in question, that it is a 'useful, new, harmonious,
characteristic, and graceful picture, and that plaintiff made
the same . . . entirely from his own original mental
conception, to which he gave visible form by posing the
said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and ar-
ranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories
in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present
graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and
shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression, and
from such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made
entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit.'
"These findings, we think, show this photograph to be
an original work of art, the product of plaintiff's intellectual
invention, of which plaintiff is the author, and of a class
of inventions for which the Constitution intended that
Congress should secure to him the exclusive right to use,
publish and sell, as it has done by section 4952 of the Re-
vised Statutes."
2Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III U. S. 53.
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On the authority of the Sarony case it has been held
that writings include maps and charts, designs, engravings,
etchings, cuts and prints,3 photographs, 4 motion picture
films, 5 musical compositions,( lithographs.7
To constitute a writing, however, there must be something
more than a mental conception not reduced to tangible
form. The law does not deal with abstractions. A plan
or scheme is not a writing and therefore is not copyright-
able. This is illustrated by such cases as Baker v. Selden s
where the plaintiff's book was a treatise on a system of
bookkeeping illustrated by specimen account book pages
consisting of ruled lines and headings showing the system
and how it was to be used in practice. The defendant used
account books based on substantially the same plan. There
was no copying of the plaintiff's explanatory matter. It
was contended by the plaintiff that the defendant infringed
its copyright. It was held that the copyright did not em-
brace the method described and defendant did not infringe,
Mr. Justice Bradley saying:
"The description of the art in a book, though entitled to
the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim
to the art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object
of the other is use. The former may be secured by copyright.
The latter can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters
patent."
In Perris v. Hexamerg the plaintiffs were owners of a
copyright in a series of maps of New York City useful to
those in the fire insurance business. The maps showed
each house and building and the classes as shown by dif-
ferent coloring and characters. The maps were made after
careful survey and were so marked by arbitrary signs ex-
plained by a key that an insurer could see at a glance what
3Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III U. S. 53, 57.
4 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Iii U. S. 53; Nottage v. Jack-
son, iI Q. B. D. 627; Falk v. Brett Lithographing Co., 48 Fed. 678; Falk v.
Donaldson, 57 Fed. 32; Falk v. City Item Printing Co., 79 Fed. 321.
'American Mutoscope & Biograph Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co., 137 Fed. 262,
265. 6 White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., i39 Fed. 427, 430.
7Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S. 239, 242, 249.
8 IOI U. S. 99.
199 U. S. 675.
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were the character and occupancy of any particular building
or neighborhood necessary for his information in taking
risks. The defendant made the necessary survey and pub-
lished a similar series of maps of Philadelphia, using sub-
stantially the same key and coloring. It was held that
there was no infringement.
In Griggs v. Perrin-", it was held that the copyright of
a book describing a new system of shorthand, does not
protect the system apart from the language by which it is
explained, Judge Coxe saying:
"The copyright book is sacred but not the subject of which
it treats. If the defendants have described the complainant's
system they have not offended against the copyright law. If they
have copied complainant's book they have offended against the
law."
The rule is the same at common law. In the absence of
special circumstances such as fraud or breach of contract,
express or implied, one whose plan, scheme or idea, as dis-
tinguished from his unpublished manuscript, is appropri-
ated, has no redress.
In one case often cited, plaintiff devised a system of adver-
tising which was useful to insurance companies. This he
communicated to the defendant as an inducement to his
employment. The defendant appropriated the system and
did not employ the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued to recover as
if the defendant had used his property. It was held that
the complainant did not state a cause of action."
10 49 Fed. 15. So also Burnell v. Chown, 69 Fed. 993, where complainant
devised a system of collecting, classifying and publishing credit ratings with a
key. Defendant used the same system in a territory different from that coveredby plaintiff's publication. Judge Ricks:
"The most that can be claimed on behalf of the plaintiff is that the de-
fendant has appropriated his scheme, device, conception and idea for gathering
and imparting this particular information * * * admitting that they have
gathered this information and seek to impart it upon the same plan which the
plaintiff has conceived and originated, that conception is not a matter which
can be protected either by the copyright law or the common law."
See also: Amberg File & Index Co. v. Shea Smith & Co., 82 Fed. 314;
Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine 382; F. C. 2872; Burke v. Johnson, 146 Fed. 209.
"Bristol v. Equitable Life Assn. Soc., 5 N. Y. S. 131; 132 N. Y. 364;
30 N. E. 5o6.
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In another instance 12 the complainant studied the white
lead industry and formulated a plan for combining a num-
ber of companies and procured options or negotiated for
their purchase, he then laid his plan before Thomas F. Ryan
seeking his co-operation, agreeing to contribute if necessary
$200,000 if Ryan would join him, and also put up enough
money to see it through. Ryan expressed a willingness to
join, if an examination of the plan and papers by his counsel
and experts confirmed the complainant's statements to him.
Ryan, however, availed himself of the information the com-
plainant had furnished and independently of him organized
a company, got control of the industry, and made a large
profit. Complainant sued to compel him to account. In
dismissing the bill, Stevens, Vice Chancellor, said:
"Now, it has never been held, so far as I am aware, that
mere ideas are capable of legal ownership and protection. * * *
I am therefore of the opinion that complainant has no property
right in his plan regarded as an idea. Having no property right
he has no right to an account."
Trade marks, not being writings of authors, for the same
reason are not protectable under the copyright laws, and
an act based on the constitutional provisions concerning
authors and inventors was declared unconstitutional.13
A dance, telling no story, and conveying to the spectator
no other idea than that a "comely woman is illustrating
the poetry of motion in a singularly graceful fashion"14
1
2 Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq. 575, 64 At. 436. The same rule applies
in the case of inventions. Fowler v. City of New York, 121 Fed.-747; 58 C. C. A.
113; Coxe, C. J., (748):
"It is manifest that no mere abstraction, no idea however brilliant can
be the subject of a patent irrespective of the means designed to give it effect."
.See also: Ex parte Moeser C. D. (195o) 346, 118 0. G. 59o; Ex parte
Meinhardt C. D. (1907) 237, 238, 129 0. G. 3503; Burr v. Duryee, i Wall. 53"1,
57o; Westinghouse v. Borden, 170 U. S. 537; Fuller v. Yentzer, 94 U. S. 288;
Bradford v. Expanded Metal Co., 146 Fed. 984.
.3 Trade Mark Cases, 1OO U. S. 82, 94.
In Fuller v. Bemis, 5o Fed. 926, the serpentine dance by Marie Louise
Fuller, better known as Loie Fuller, was involved. This dance was in three
tableaux and is described in great detail in the report. It was alleged to have
been copyrighted and the bill averred that it was a dramatic composition and
was being presented at Madison Square Theatre at New York with great suc-
cess. The infringement complained of was the production by the defendant
of Miss Fuller's dance with merely colorable alterations. Judge Lacombe held
that the complainant's performance was not a dramatic composition. "It is
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is not a writing and has been held not copyrightable sub-
ject matter. So it has been held that a performance con-
sisting of songs by an actress dressed to impersonate other
singers, prefaced by a short and commonplace dialogue,
with moving pictures during the intervals when the per-
former is changing costumes, is not copyrightable, because
not a writing.'s
A similar judicial fate met the tank of real water in the
"Tank Drama."' 16 In the fourth act of their play, "Donna
Bianca" or "Brought to Light," the plaintiffs set in the
stage a real tank three feet square and seven feet deep
filled with real water, "the elaboration," said Judge La-
combe, "of Mr. Vincent Crummles' dramatic conception
of a real pump and wash tubs." 17  This water flowed through
a trough from behind a battlemented wall at the rear of
the stage, falling into a tank and running off underneath
essential," he said, "to such a composition, that it should tell some story. The
plot may be simple. It may be but a narrative or representation of a single
transaction; but it must repeat or mimic some action, speech, emotion, passion
or character, real or imaginary. And when it does it is the ideas thus expressed
which become subject to copyright. An examination of the description of
complainant's dance, as filed for copyright, shows that the end sought for and
accomplished was solely the devising of a series of graceful movements, com-
bined with an attractive arrangement of drapery, lights and shadows, telling
no story, portraying no character, depicting no emotion. The merely mechanical
movements by which effects are produced on the stage are not subjects of copy-
right where they convey no ideas whose arrangement makes up a dramatic
composition. Surely, those described and practiced here convey, and were
devised to convey, to the spectator no other idea than that a comely woman is
illustrating the poetry of motion in a singularly graceful fashion. Such an
idea may be pleasing, but it can hardly be called dramatic."
,5 Barnes v. Miner, 122 Fed. 48o.
16 Serrana et al v. Jefferson, 33 Fed. 347; compare Daly v. Palmer, 6 Blatch.
256, Fed. Cas. 3552; Daly v. Webster, 56 Fed. 483, 486; Daly v. Brady, 39 Fed.
265; 69 Fed. 285; 175 U. S. 148; Vernon v. Schubert, 220 Fed. 694; Eichel v.
Marcin, 241 Fed. 404; Stevenson v. Harris, 238 Fed. 432; Chappell v. Fields,
210 Fed. 864; Bloom v. Nixon, 125 Fed. 977; Savage v. Hoffman, x59 Fed. 584.
27 It will be recalled that Nicholas and Smike, on their way to Portsmouth,
were overtaken by dusk twelve miles from their destination. They turned
into an inn and there met Mr. Crummles. After a bowl of punch, Mr. Crummles
discoursed on theatrical matters, finally persuading Nich6las to join his com-
pany as actor and dramatic adapter.
"We'll have a new show-piece out directly," said the manager. "Let
me see-peculiar resources of this establishment-new and splendid scenery-
you must manage to introduce a real pump and two washing tubs."
"Into the piece?" said Nicholas.
"Yes," replied the manager. "I bought 'em cheap at a sale the other
day; and they'll come in admirably. That's the London plan. Then look up'
some dresses and properties, and have a piece written to fit them. Most of
the theatres keep an author on purpose."
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the stage. The water in this tank and trough represented
a river. It was crossed by a bridge, upon which, after
an angry dialogue between the hero and the villain of the
the play, there ensued a struggle in which the villain fell
through the bridge into the water below. The defendants
were putting on at the Academy of Music in New York a
play entitled "A Dark Secret." Here, too, there was placed
upon or set into the stage a tank considerably larger than
the plaintiffs' tank and trough, also filled with real water
and intended to represent the river Thames. Into this tank
the heroine of the play was thrown after appropriate dia-
logue. It was contended that the defendants infringed the
copyright in the plaintiffs' play. "It is alleged," said Judge
Lacombe, "that these immersion scenes in the two plays
are prominent features and add greatly to their attractive-
ness." He continued: "There is nothing original in the
incident thus represented on the stage. Heroes and hero-
ines, as well as villains, of both sexes, have for a time whereof
the memory of the theatre-goer runneth not to the contrary,
been precipitated into conventional ponds, lakes, rivers, and
seas. So frequent a catastrophe may fairly be regarded
as the common property of all playwrights. The plaintiffs'
contention is founded solely upon the circumstance that in
their play the river into which the fall takes place is mimicked
by a tank filled with real water, instead of by an apparatus
constructed of cloth, canvas, or painted pasteboard. Such
a mechanical contrivance, however, is not protected by
a copyright of the play in which it is introduced. The
decisions which extend the definition of 'dramatic composi-
tion' so as to include situations and 'scenic' effects, do not
cover the mere mechanical instrumentalities by which such
effects or situations are produced."
What-is an Author?
"An author," said Mr. Justice Miller, "is he to whom
anything -owes its origin; originator; maker; one who com-
pletes a work of science or literature," and accordingly
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held that a photographer who posed a subject, selected the
costume, draperies and other various accessories so as to
present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light
and shade, and suggesting and evoking the desired expression,
was an author and the photograph an original work of art.".
An author is, therefore, the creator of the particular work
involved, bearing in mind always that the copyright covers
not the subject matter but the personal reaction of the
individual-the intellectual work bestowed-upon the sub-
ject matter.19 In the Sarony case it was not a portrait of
18 Burrow-Giles Lithographing Co. v. Sarony, III U. S. 53, 60; Pagano v.
Beseler, 234 Fed. 963; Gross v. Seligman, 212 Fed. 93o; Bolles v. Outing Co.,
i75 U. S. 262. In Nottage v. Jackson, ixi Q. B. D. 627, the plaintiffs described
themselves as the authors of the photograph which was pirated. It appeared
that they had arranged with the captain of the Australian cricketers to take a
photograph of the whole team in a group; and they sent one of the artists in
their employ from London to some country town to do it.
The question in the case was whether the plaintiffs, who owned the estab-
lishment in London, where the photographs were made from the negative and
were sold, and who had the negative taken by one of their men, were the authors,
or the man who, for their benefit, took the negative. It was held that the latter
was the author and the action failed because plaintiffs had described them-
selves as authors.
Brett, M. R., said in regard to who was the author: "The nearest I can
come to, is that it is the person who effectively is as near as he can be the catise
of the picture which is produced, that is, the person who has superintended
the arrangement, who has actually formed the picture by putting the persons
in position, and arranging the place where the people are to be-the man who isthe effective cause of that.'
Lord Justice Cotton said: "In my opinion 'author' involves originating,
making, producing, as the inventive or master mind, the thing which is to be
protected, whether it be a drawing, or a painting, or a photograph"; and Lord
Justice Bowen says that photography is to be treated for the purposes of the
act as an art, and the author is the man who really represents, creates, or gives
effect to the idea, fancy or imagination.
The appeal of plaintiffs from the original judgment against them was
accordingly dismissed.
Quoted and cited with approval in Burrow-Giles Lithographing Co. v.
Sarony, III U. S. 53, 60.
1Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U. S. 239, 249. In hold-
ing that circus posters were the proper subject of copyright, Mr. Justice Holmes
said: "It is obvious also that the plaintiffs' case is not affected by the fact,
if it be one, that the pictures represent actual groups-visible things. They
seem from the testimony to have been composed from hints or descriptions,
not from sight of a performance. But even if they had been drawn from the
life, that fact would not deprive them of protection. The opposite proposition
would mean that a portrait by Velasquez or Whistler was common property
because others might try their hand on the same face. Others are free to copy
the original. They are not free to copy the copy. Blunt v. Patten, 2 Paine
397, 400. See Kelly v. Morris, L. R. i Eq. 697; Morris v. Wright, L. R. 5 Ch.
279. The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Per-
sonality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even
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Oscar Wilde which was protected, but the portrait which
Sarony had created.
What is intellectual work upon common material natur-
ally raises issues of great nicety.20
What prorotes the progress of science and useful arts?
Given a writing of an author within the meaning of the
constitution, whether or not it tends to promote the progress
of science and useful arts is a source of some difficulty. The
useful, however, is not limited to that which satisfies im-
mediately bodily needs.21
Whether or not a work tends to promote the progress of
science and useful arts depends, speaking generally, upon
its merit and its morality.
Merit.
The degree of merit required by the judicial critics need
not discourage any one from entering the field of literature
or art. A very little is enough, and a work will be protected
if it has any merit at all, however modest.
"It is difficult, almost impossible," says Burton in his
Book Hunter, "to find a book from which something, either
valuable or amusing, may not be found if the proper alembic
be applied. I know books that are curious, and really
amusing from their excessive badness. If you want to find
precisely how a thing ought not to be said, you take one
of them down and make it perform the service of the intoxi-
in handwriting and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible,
which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a
restriction in the words of the act."
"The teachings of science and the rules and methods of useful art have
their final end in application and use; and this application and use are what
the public derive from the publication of a book which teaches them. But as
embodied and taught in a literary composition or book, their essence consitss
only in their statement. This alone is what is secured by the copyright." (Mr.
Justice Bradley in Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 99, 104.)
1 20 In a case over the alleged piracy of a stenographic report of speeches
by Lord Rosebery, it was held that the shorthand reporter who took down and
afterwards transcribed the speeches was the author of the transcript, that being
his work. Walter v. Lane (Igoo) A. C. 539; 83 L. T. (N. S.) 289. This is fur-
ther illustrated by the cases which hold that there is no copyright in the thing
itself, e. g., news, but only in the form in which it is conveyed. Springfield v.
Thame, 89 L. T. (N. S.) 242. See in this connection International News Ser-
vice v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, XVII Michigan Law Review (April,
1919) P. 490.
21 Mr. Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188
U. S. 239, 249.
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eating Spartan slave. . . . There are no better farces
on or off the stage than when two or three congenial spirits
ransack books of this kind, and compete with each other
in taking fun out of them."
"Wherever I journey," says Owen Wister, "I read the
time tables. I have been reading them for about fifty
years. I prefer them to most of the novels you can pick
from the newsboy's arms. To me our Official Railway
Guide is the great American romance. The mere names of
the stations-please meditate upon San Diego, Prairie du
Chien, Fremont, New Orleans, New London, Sioux City-
disclose to him who knows how to read them, many pages
of our history. Merely think of checking your trunk from
Cicero to Bismarck!"
The most heterogeneous collection of what Elia calls
"things in books' clothing" 22 have appeared in the reports
22 Lamb: Detached Thoughts on Books and Reading.
"To mind the inside of a book is to entertain one's self with the forced
product of another man's brain. Now I think a man of quality and breeding
may be much amused with the natural sprouts of his own."-Lord Foppington
in the Relapse."An ingenious acquaintance of mine was so much struck with this bright
sally of his Lordship that he has left off reading altogether, to the great improve-
ment of his originality. At the hazard of losing some credit on this head, I must
confess that I dedicate no inconsiderable portion of my time to other people's
thoughts. I dream away my life in others' speculations. I love to lose myself
in other men's minds. When I am not walking, I am reading; I cannot sit and
think. Books think for me.
"I have no repugnances. Shaftsbury is not too genteel for me, nor Jona-
than Wild too low. I can read anything which I call a book. There are things
in that shape which I cannot allow .for such.
"In this catalogue of books which are no books-biblia a-biblia-I reckon
Court Calendars, Directories, Pocket Books, Draught Boards, bound and let-
tered on the back, Scientific Treatises, Almanacks, Statutes at Large; the works
of Hume, Gibbon, Robertson, Beattie, Soame Jenyns, and generally, all those
volumes which 'no gentleman's library should be without': the Histories of'
Flavius josephus (that learned Jew), and Paley's Moral Philosophy. With
these exceptions I can read almost anything. I bless my stars for a taste so
catholic, so unexcluding.
"I confess that it moves my spleen to see these things in books' clothing
perched upon shelves, like false saints, usurpers of true shrines, intruders into
the sanctuary, -thrusting out the legitimate occupants. To reach down a well-
bound semblance of a volume, and hope it some kind-hearted play-book, then,
opening what 'seem it leaves,' to come bolt upon a withering Population Essay;
to expect a Steele, or a Farquhar, and find-Adam Smith; to view a well ar-
ranged assortment of blockheaded Encyclopaedias (Anglicanas or Metropoli-
tanas) set out in an array of russia or morocco, when a tithe of that good leather
would comfortably clothe my shivering folios, would renovate Paracelsus him-
self, and enable old Raymund Lully to look like himself again in the world.
I never see these imposters but I long to strip them, to warm my ragged veterans
in their spoils."
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with counsel to contend their literary merit. Legal blanks,23
the arrangement of cases in a law report,2 4 credit ratings,25
while directories, guide books and the like seem more at-
tractive to the pirate than literature.26 Catalogues have
often been involved in litigation and from insufficient prem-
ises it has been sought to draw the conclusion that catalogues
cannot be the subject matter of copyright.
The first catalogue case in point of time was Hotten v.
Arthur27 which involved a catalogue of books. Complainant,
23 Brightley v. Littleton, 37 Fed. lO3. •
2 Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617, 645.25 Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 Fed. 703.
2 8 Architectural Dictionary, Barfield v. Nicholson, 2 Sim. & St. 1; SJiers'
School Dictionary, Spiers v. Brown, 6 W. R. 352; Swedish Dictionary, Chuls v.
Gronlund, 4o Fed. 145; Gazetteer of England and Wales, Lewis v. Fullerton,
2 Beav. 6; Hand Book of Switzerland, Murray v. Bogue, i Drew. 353; London
Directory, Kelly v. Hooper, 4 Jur. 21, I Y. & Coll. C. C. 197; Kelly v. Morris,
L. R. i Eq. 697; Morris v. Ashbee, L. R. 7 Eq. 34; Morris v. Wright, L. R. 5
Ch. 279; Brighton Suburban Directory, Kelly v. Hodge, 29 L. T., N. S., 387;
New York Directory, Trow Co. v. U. S. Directory Co., 122 Fed. 191; Chicago
Directory, Chicago Dollar Directory Co. v. Chicago Directory Co., 66 Fed. 977;
Chicago Directory Co. v. U. S. Co., 121 Fed. 191; Society Directory, List Pub-
lishing Co. v. Keller, 30 Fed. 772; Social Reg. Assn. v. Murphy, 128 Fed. 116;.
Trades Directory, Lamb v. Evans (1892) 3 Ch. 681, C. A. (1893) x Ch., 218;
East India Calendar and Directory, Mathewson v. Stockdale, 12 Ves. Jr. 270;
Gardeners' Year Book Almanac & Directory, Hogg v. Scott, L. R. 18 Eq. 444;
Court Calendar, Longman v. Winchester, 16 Ves. 268; Almanac, Company of
Stationers v. Seymour, Skinner 234; Psalm Book, Company of Stationers v.
Wright, Skin. Nev. 234; Chronology, Trusler v. Murray, I East. 363 n.; List of
Hounds, Cox v. Land & Water Journal, L. R. 9 Eq. 324; Quotations from Stock
Exchange, Exchange Telegraph Co. v. Gregory, 73 L. T. 120 (1896), 1 Q. B. 147;
List of Bills of Sale, Trade Auxiliary Co. v. Middleborough Assn., L. R. 40
Ch. D. 425; Index to Abstracts, Banker v. Caldwell, 3 Minn. 94; Clyde Bill of
Entry and Shipping List, McLean v. Moody, 20 Sess. Cas., 2 Ser. 1154; Wolford
v. Johnson, Id., 116o n.; Compilation in regard to Bankruptcy Register, Trade
Auxiliary Co. v. Irish Trade Agency, Irish L. T. 37; Directory, William v. Smythe,
no Fed. 961; Newspaper Telegrams, Wilson v. Rawcroft, 4 A. L. J. R. 57;
Wilson v. Luke, I V. L. R. (E), 127; Mineral Statistics of United Kingdom,
Scott v. Stanford, L. R. 3 Eq. 718; Notes to Scott's Border Minstrelsy, Black v.
Murray, 9 S. S. C., 3 Ser. 34; Birthday Scripture Text Book, Mack v. Potter,
L. R. 14 Eq. 431; Flora's Interpreter, (Language of Flowers), Webb v. Powers,
F. C. 17323, 2 W. & M., 497; The Art of Defense with the Broadsword, Raworth
v. Wilkes, i Camp. 94; Birds Eye View of Seat of War, Standard v. Lee, 6 L. R.
Ch. 346; Collection of Songs, Canadian Music Pub. Assn. v. Winnifrith Bros.,
15 0. R. 164; Collection of Poems, Campbell v. Scott, II Sim. 31; Biographical
Sketches, Gemmild v. Garland, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep., 32r, 12 Ont. Rep. 139; Cor-
respondence of Washington, Folsom v. Marsh, F. C., 4904; Childs A. B. C.,
Childs Ladder Primers, Lennie v. Pillars, S. S. C. 2 Ser. Vol. 5 P., 466; Adams
Latin Grammar, Gray v. Russell, F. C., 5728; Covills English Grammar, Greene
v. Bishop, F. C., 5763; Graded Lessons in English, Reed v. Holliday, 1g Fed.
325; Guide to Science, Jarrould v. Houlston, 3 H. & J. 7o8; System of Dress
Cutting, Harburg v. Dunisday, io V. L. R. (E) 172; see Copinger on Copyright,
40, 44, 64; Drone on Copyright, 159, i6o; Story's Equity, Sec. 941.
27 (1863) x H. & M. 603; 71 Fuel Reprint 264.
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a bookseller, issued a catalogue which was not a mere dry
list of names of books and their prices, but contained a
short account of their history or notices of their contents
and anecdotes. Defendant, a rival bookseller, without li-
cense copied parts of the complainant's catalogue. Vice-
Chancellor Page Wood directed an injunction.
In Cobbett v. Woodward8 Lord Romilly refused to follow
Vice-Chancellor Page Wood and refused to protect a house-
furnishing guide.
In Grace v. Newman29 Vice-Chancellor Hall followed Hotten
v. Arthur and protected a stonemason's catalogue containing
illustrations of tombstones.
Cobbeti v. Woodward was, however, in 1882, expressly
overruled in Maple v. Junior Army & Navy Stores,30 Jessel,
M. R., saying:
"I doubt whether Cobbett v. Woodward is correct. Even
on Lord Romilly's statement a part was entitled to copyright,
and that would protect the whole. If there is copyright in any
part it protects all the original matter. Illustrations, for this
purpose, are part of the text."
"I cannot see why we should so construe the Act as to pro-
tect people who take other people's pictures, a proceeding which
does not at first sight appear to be particularly honest. If the
court can so construe the Act as to prevent dishonesty, it ought
to do so. That would be my opinion if there was nothing else
to be considered."
In I89831 the rule was considerably enlarged. The sub-
ject matter was a druggist's catalogue which had been copied
by a competitor.
"But what has-been done in this case," said Mr. Justice
North, "is to leave the neighbor who was the first to prepare a
catalogue to bear all the expense and trouble of doing it, and to
28 (1872) L. R. 14 Eq. 407; 27 L. T. (N. S.) 26o.
2 (1875) L. R. i Eq. 623.30L. R. 21 Ch. D. 369; 47 L. T. (N. S.) 589.
3"Callis v. Cater, 78 L. T. (N. S.) 613. The question is no longer de-
batable in England and catalogues are a recognized subject of copyright protec-
tion. Davis v. Benjamin (19o6) 2 Ch. 491; 95 L. T. (N. S.) 671; Weathersby v.
International Horse Agency & Ex., Ch. (1910) 2 Ch. 297; IO2 L. T. (N. S.) 856;
Cooper v. Stephens (1895) i Ch. 567; 7 L. T. (N. S.) 39o; Marshall v. Bull,
85 L. T. (N. S.) 77, 81.
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set to work without trouble or expense to take a copy of that
catalogue and have one printed from it. The man who acts thus
is simply using his neighbor's expense and labor for his own ad-
vantage. He is what is called pirating his neighbor's book. The
question is whether that is a thing he has a right to do."
"I think I am bound by these cases. They seem to me to
apply here, and I must hold that as there is copyright in a directory
there is copyright in a list of articles prepared by a person who
deals in them, and advertises them as articles which he sells, and
in which he names the prices at which he will sell. That, it seems
to me, is a case in which the law is settled, and applies to a cata-
logue such as this."
The Supreme Court of the United States has in effect
adopted the liberal view which prevails in England,32 and
is inclined to make the defendant himself the judge of the
merit of the plaintiff's composition, and to hold that any-
thing which is good enough for the defendant to steal is
good enough for the law to protect.
The authority of Mott Iron Works v. Clow,"3 where it was
-held that a catalogue of plumber's supplies was not a proper
subject for copyright is much weakened by these decisions
and it probably must be considered overruled.
If any one doubts that catalogues ought to be copy-
rightable he should read Newton's chapter on "Old Cata-
logues & New Prices"''  and Eugene Field's Chapter XVI
2Bleistein v. Donaldson, 188 U. S. 239.
3 82 Fed. 316. Da Prato Statuary Co. v. Guiliani Statuary Co., 189
Fed. go. Copyright in a catalogue of Ecclesiastical statuary was held valid.
Other courts have ruled similarly in White v. Shapiro, 227 Fed. 957; National
Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 Fed. 215; Golden Rule Co. v. B. V. D. Co.,
242 Fed. 929. See also for the law of England concerning such trade compila-
tions: Lamb v. Evans, 68 L. T. (N. S.) 131, 134. Bowen, L. J. Kay, L. J. (136);
Scott v. Stanford, 16 L. T. (N. S.) 51. Vice Chancellor Wood (53); Exchange
Telegraph Company v. Gregory, 74 L. T. (N. S.) 83; Leslie v. Young (House of
Lords) (1894) A. C. 335; Ager v. Peninsular and Oriental System Steam Navi-
gation Company, L. R. 26 Ch. Div. 637, where complainant's book was a tele-
graph code; Church v. Linton, 25 Ontario Rep. i3i; a blank form for stam-
merers. In Hall v. Whittington, i8 Vict. L. R. 525, the publication consisted of
information collected by searches made at the public registry offices, and pre-
sented in the form of lists of bills of sale and notices of intention to file them,
stock mortgages and renewals, liens on crops or wool, contracts, insolvencies,
dissolutions of partnership, sheriff's sales, applications for probate, dividends
and other particulars. Held copyrightable; Stone v. White, 8 N. Z. L. R. 58;
a railway time table.
34 Newton-The Amenities of Book Collecting-Boston Atlantic Monthly
Press, 1918.
228 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
which is entitled "The Malady called Catalogitis" in the
"Love Affairs of a Bibliomaniac."as
The refusal to protect catalogues and the like, mani-
fested by some judges, is likely due to the fact that un-
consciously it is natural to feel that such things, are not
literature, indeed, the courts have often said so, but copy-
rightable literature need not be a work of genius. Useful
books are seldom inspired. No one wants an inspired law
book, a transfigured directory or an idealized dictionary.
Accuracy, care, discrimination, are the qualities needed to
produce such works, not the divine fire.
To be the proper subject matter of copyright, therefore,
there need only be, somewhere in the work, an exercise
of the creative powers of the mind, and if it have some value
either as conveying information that is new or old infor-
mation in such form as required in its preparation judg-
ment, selection, or intellectual effort, the copyright law
protects it.
In speaking of a book which he called a well designed
stimulant to the special faculties which are required to
meet a particular emergency-the successful passing of ex-
aminations, Lord Justice Collins said:
"As I have already said, though the work does not perhaps
range in the highest scale of literature, it has shown a very con-
siderable amount of skill, and certainly the adaptation of means
to an end; for, whatever we think of the end, the means seem so
admirably adapted to the end that the defendant, Mr. Marshall,
pays the highest compliment one man can pay to another-namely,
the compliment of imitation. The sources from which these
works were drawn were common. It was open to anybody to
compile an edition of 'As You Like It,' and open to him to go to
35 " Bring in the candles, good servitor, and range tham at my bed's head;
sweet avocation awaits me, for here I have a goodly parcel of catalogues with
which to commune. They are messages from Methuen, Sotheran, Libbie,
Irvine, Hutt, Davie, Baer, Crawford, Bangs, McClurg, Matthews, Francis,
Bouton, Scribner, Benjamin, and a score of other friends in every part of Christen-
dom; they deserve and they shall have my respectful-nay, my enthusiastic
attention. Once more I shall seem to be in the old familiar shops where treasures
abound and where patient delving bringeth rich rewards. Egad, what a spend-
thrift I shall be this night; pence, shillings, thalers, marks, francs, dollars, sover-
eigns-they are the same to me!
"Then, after I have comprehended all the treasures within reach, how
sweet shall be my dreams of shelves overflowing with the wealth of which my
fancy has possessed me."
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all the sources of criticism and to make selections from them.
It was open to him to cull quotations from other books and to
put them together as the author of the plaintiffs' book has done,
and clearly that was subject matter of copyright for them. He
has shown skill and industry and many higher qualities."
It was of course argued that quotations are the common
property of everybody, and that the defendant ought not
to be restrained from using those which were apt.
"That leaves out the whole merit," said the Master of the
Rolls, "the felicity of the quotation; its adaptability to a par-
ticular end; its illustration of a particular characteristic. All
those things enter into the choice of *one quotation as apart from
another. That is a process which may involve gifts both of knowl-
edge and intelligence. The aptness of quotation does not depend
on the particular page or number of lines in which it is found;
and that is all you find if you obey a certain direction to go to a
certain place and take it. It does not entitle you to annex the
skill and judgment and taste which has dictated the selection.""3
When the merit claimed for work is dependent upon its
humor the question is frequently difficult. What to a court
of a serious turn of mind would appear to be trivial and
useless might to another seem amusing, and if amusing,
useful. 37 A court, in order to determine the question of
36 Moffatt & Paige Lim. v. George Gill & Sons Lim., etc., 86 L. T. (N. S.)
469.
s7 In Henderson v. Tompkins, 6o Fed. 758, the complainant was the propri-
etor of the Chicago Opera House, where he presented a dramatic composition
entitled "Ali Baba" or "Morgiana and the Forty Thieves," of which he was the
owner of the copyright. The bill of complaint, after beginning with the usual
resonant allegations with which bills in equity are plentifully sprinkled even
today, continued: "That a part of said dramatic composition was as follows:
'Cassim (scornfully): But Ali Baba's selection is certain. Nico: I know it.
Arraby: How do you know? Hack: She had a dream last night. Caliph
(coming down stage): I wonder if dreams come true."' And that the said dia-
logue was then immediately followed by a song entitled, "Quartette for Ali
Baba: I Wonder if Dreams Come True," consisting of a number of verses of
eight lines, in each of which the second, fourth and eighth lines consist of the
refraifi, "I wonder if dreams come true," and the chorus after each verse is as
follows:
"Hi diddle diddle,
The cat and fiddle,
The parrot and monkey too.
Bells they are ringing,
There's fighting and singing,
I wonder if dreams come true."
And that each of the said verses, all except the second, fourth and eighth
lines aforesaid, were of a so-called "topical" nature (that is to say, relating to
topics of current interest), and that the matter of the said topical lines was
intended to be changed or varied from time to time to introduce allusions to
new topics, the whole constituting what is known as the topical song, "I Wonder
if Dreams Come True."
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copyrightability, must be at once a censor and a critic.
Several judges have hesitated to assume the role. "If,"
said one of them who appreciated his difficult position,
"judicial tribunals could lay down maxims by which to
determine judicially that dramatic compositions claimed to
be humorous, or to appeal to the sense of humor, are in this
particular within or without the copyright act, they would
by demonstration be in possession of rules which would
enable them to be themselves at all times witty at their
own option."38 And, too, when judges try to answer the
vexed question, "What is Art," complete uniformity of
decision can hardly be expected. A safe rule has been laid
down by the Supreme Court, when Mr. Justice Holmes
remarked:
"It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth
It was then alleged "that the song with its introduction formed a sub-
stantial and valuable part of complainant's dramatic composition"; that de-
fendant presented a spectacle at the Boston Theatre, Boston, and that "a sub-
stantial and material and important portion consists of a dialogue between
various characters in relation to having had a dream, the said dialogue ter-
minating in a speech by one of said characters, as follows: 'I wonder if dreams
come true,' which said speech is immediately followed by a topical song of a
number of verses of eight lines each, the second, fourth and eighth of which
consist of the words or refrain, 'I Wonder if Dreams Come True'; that each of
said verses is followed by the chorus of your orator's said song, and that the
remainder of the lines in each verse are topical in character, and in substantial
imitation of the said topical portions of your orator's said copyrighted song."
A demurrer was interposed and it was argued that the so-called dramatic
composition was so utterly worthless and insignificant as to be unworthy of
protection.
Judge Putnam overruled the demurrer (762), saying:
"The defendant alleges that the subject matter of this copyright does
not tend to promote the progress of science and useful arts, and therefore is not
vnthin the scope of the power granted congress by the constitution. So far
as this is a general proposition, aimed at all dramatic compositions of the char-
acter in question in the case at bar, it needs but little consideration. The court
is not disposed to take the narrow view of the expression 'useful arts' propounded
on either side of this case, nor does it seem necessary to determine whether the
purpose announced in this paragraph of the Constitution directly or indirectly
limits the powers of Congress, as claimed by the defendant and denied by the
complainant. It is enough to say that whether we look only at the direct re-
sults of what is addressed to the taste, to the imagination, or the capacity of
being amused, and the enjoyment which immediately follows therefrom, or
whether we look further, and consider what is essential to keep the physical,
moral and intellectual powers refreshed, all such have been regarded by the
courts, ever since patents or copyrights were authorized by statute, as within
the range of utility and the useful arts. Even when the intellect is strained to
accomplish its greatest results, the standard prescription from Euclid may be
useful, but an occasional one from the Book of Nonsense is not to be despised."
38 Putnam, C. J., in Henderson v. Tompkins, 6o Fed. 758, 762.
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of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most ob-
vious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be
sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them
repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which
their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance,
whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have
been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other
end copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a
public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the
interest of any public they have a commercial value-it would
be bold to say that they 'have not an aesthetic and educational
value-and the taste of any public is not to be treated with con-
tempt. It is an ultimate fact for the moment, whatever may be
our hopes for a change."-' 9
When lay persons presume to pass on art they should
be circumspect and recall Whistler's comment on the action
of General Rush Hawkins, who was American Commissioner
at the Paris Exposition, and, not appreciating Whistler's
etchings, wrote him:
39 Mr. Justice Holmes, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188
U. S. 239 (251): In this case the lower courts had held that circus posters were-
not artistic works within the meaning of. the copyright act and the language-
quoted was used by Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, in
overruling this contention and reversing the decisions below. Among other
authorities cited in this opinion is Ruskin's "Element of Drawing," which re-
calls the celebrated case of Whistler v. Ruskin, which is curiously relevant to
this discussion. Whistler placed a price of 200 guineas on the Nocturne in
Black and Gold-The Falling Rocket. Ruskin dissented from Whistler's no-
tions of art, and in the course of a review in "Fors Clavigera," said:
"I have seen and heard much of cockney impudence before now, but
never expected to hear a coxcomb ask 200 guineas for flinging a pot of paint
into the public's face."
A libel suit followed. In the course of his testimony Whistler defined a
picture:
"It is an arrangement of line, form and color first, and I make use of any
incident of it which shall bring about a symmetrical result."
Rosetti was called as a witness and he was asked by the Attorney General,
who represented Ruskin, concerning The Falling Rocket:
"Is it a gem?" "No."
"Is it an exquisite painting?" "No."
"Is it very beautiful?" "No."
"Is it a work of art?" "Yes, it is."
Burne-Jones was asked about the same picture:
"Now, take the Nocturne in Black and Gold-The Falling Rocket-
is that, in your opinion, a work of art?"
Burne-Jones: "No, I cannot say that it is. It is only one of a thousand
failures that artists have made in their efforts to paint Night."
Other people, equally distinguished, testified that in their opinion the
Nocturne in Black and Gold-The Falling Rocket-was not a work of art.
The jury awarded one farthing damages, and the court declined to give costs-
to the successful plaintiff. The details of this interesting trial are to be found
in the Pennells' Life of Whistler, Chapter r9, and in Whistler's "Gentle Art of
Making Enemies."
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"Ten of your exhibits have not received the approval of
the jury. Will you kindly remove them."
Whistler called and took them away, and afterwards
said:
"The pretty embarrassment of General Hawkins on the
occasion of my visit I myself liked, thinking it seemly and part
of the good form of a West Point man who is taught that a drum-
head court martial-and what else in the experience of this finished
officer should so fit him for sitting in judgment upon pictures-
should be presided at with grave and softened demeanor."
Chicago, Illinois. Edward S. Rogers.
